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RELEASED TIME RECONSIDERED: THE NEW YORK PLAN
IS TESTED*
THE First Amendment,' made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 prohibits state and national laws "respecting an establishment
of religion." It aims to promote religious freedom for all by keeping govern-
ment independent of the varied religious rivalries in the community.3 In the
Everson 4 and McCollum 5 cases the Supreme Court interpreted the Amend-
ment to interdict laws which establish a church, aid one or all religions, or
levy taxes to support religious activities and institutions. Furthermore,
government may not influence a person's decision whether or not to go to
church or what type of religious belief, if any, to hold.6 Thus, the Constitution
today goes further than prohibiting the establishment of a state church; it
endeavors to keep religion and the state separate.7
*Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. 2d 463 (1951), prob. jteris nolcd 20 U.S.L
NVEx 3154 (1952).
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." U.S. Coxsr. AsImD. I.
2. Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), and West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (free exercise of religion);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and Illinois ex rcl. McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (no establishment of religion).
3. Id. at 227. See also id. at 212, 215, 216, 232; Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 40, 59 (1947).
4. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (publicly financed school
bus transportation for parochial students upheld against challenge that it was unconsti-
tutional aid by the state in support of religion). See Notes, 49 CoL. L RE'. 836
(1949) ; 60 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1947) ; 96 U. PA. L R v. 230 (1947).
5. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released
time program, in which children could obtain religious instruction during public school
time on school property, declared an unconstitutional aid to religion). See Notes, 43
It.. L REv. 374 (1948) ; 23 Norm DAam LAw. 456 (1948) ; 57 Y1,.T L. J. 1114 (1948).
6. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attend-
ance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect 'a vall of separation betveen Church and
State." Black, J., in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); re-
affirmed in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210-11,
(1948).
7. Some writers dispute the validity of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment. They argue that the First Amendment was intended only to prevent
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The First Amendment also protects religious freedom by prohibiting gov-
ernment hostility to religion or interference with its free exercise." According-
ly, the right of people to practice 9 and propagate 10 religious beliefs is safe-
guarded. This includes freedom to abstain or dissent from any or all religious
identifications."
The policies embodied in these two First Amendment prohibitions, although
directed toward the same goal, in practice may sometimes conflict.'- Thus, in
allowing to religious groups the tax exemption generally available for charit-
able institutions,' 3 government may be observing the prohibition against
the governmenlt from establishing one sect in a preferred position, but it does not prevent
general support by government for religion on a non-discriminatory basis. See O'NEIL,
RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTON (1949); PARSONS, TuE FIRST
FREmom (1948); Corwin, The Supreme Court As National School Board, 14 LAW &
CoNT=P. PROB. 3 (1949); Fahy, Religion, Education and the Supreme Court, 14 LAw
& CoNTEMP. PRoD. 73 (1949) ; Murray, Law or Prepossessions?', 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROu.
23 (1949). The interpretation given the First Amendment by the Supreme Court has
been ably defended by other scholars. See Pfeffer, Church and Slate--somnethily Less
Than Separation, 19 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1 (1951); BUTTS, THE AmERicAN TRADITION
IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1950); STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN TlE UNITED
STATES (1950).
8. At Madison's insistence, the Virginia Bill of Rights read: "All men are equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience." This was
the first time that this right had been asserted in any body of fundamental law. Id. at 341.
The "Memorial and Remonstrance" of 1784 written by Madison repeated thig right. And
Madison's demands were largely responsible for the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment. Id. at 345. For a full discussion of the Federal Constitutional provisions
see id., at c. 8.
9. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1934) (chil-
dren cannot be compelled to salute the flag contrary to their religious beliefs). But cl.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)
(Mormons' religious belief in polygamous marriage not given protection).
10. Religious missionaries may distribute handbills, Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147 (1939), even in a privately owned company town, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U,S,
501 (1946). And the state may not prohibit door to door distribution of religious litera-
ture, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Nor may municipal officials be given
discretionary power to grant or withhold permits for public religious meetings, Nilemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
11. Agnostics and athiests are protected by the First Amendment. Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (free thinker's challenge of state
aid to religion sustained). But see PARsoNs, THr FIRST FRmEou 79 (1948); Zorach
v. Clauson, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 339, 344 (1950), and White, J., concurring in Gordon v. Board
of Education, 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 476-80 (1948).
12. The conflicting nature of the free exercise and no establishment clauses of the
First Amendment are suggested in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18
(1947) ; and Illinois ex rtl. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211-12
(1948). See Pfeffer, supra note 7, at 23; Murray, supra note 7, at 32.41; Fahy, supra
note 7, 88-90; Note, 49 CoL L. REv. 968, 988-90 (1949).
13. Exempted from Federal income tax are corporations, funds, and foundations
"operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes."
INT. REv. CoDE § 101 (6) ; "Religious or apostolic associations or corporations ... even
if such associations or corporations engage in business for the common benefit of the
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hostility to religion,14 but at the same time it may encroach on the no aid
policy. Similarly conflict results when government tries to make provision
for the free exercise of religion. Examples are: furnishing military chap-
lains,15 daily bible reading in the public schools,10 and released time religious
instruction.2
7
members... !' INT. REv. CODE § 101 (18) ; and "corporations organized for the exclusive
purpose of holding title to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the
(net income) . . . to an organization which itself is exempt from the tax." I:ir. REv.
CoDE § 101 (14). Gifts to religious organizations are exempt from gift tax, IL.;r. Rt,-.
CODE § 1004 (a) (2), and estate tax, INT. REv. CoDE § 812 (d), and may be deducted
from the income of the donor, INT. REv. CODE § 23 (o) (2), Ii.T. REv. Coon § 23 (q)
(2). State income taxes provide the same exemptions, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX Cor
§ 17315 (6) (Deering 1944) ; N.Y. TAX LAW § 360, (10) (b). General property tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations are available in all states, e.g. CAL. Rxv. & TAX Corn
§ 206 (Deering 1944); N.Y. TAX LAw § 4 (6), and are considered important enough
to be guaranteed by the Constitutions of two-thirds of the states, e.g., FLA. Co:;sr. Ar.
XVI, sec. 16; N.M. CoxsT. ART. VIII; CALF. CoNsT. ART. XIII § 1%; See Tourny,
JuDIcIAL Docinums OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AURICA 173 n. 10 (1948). Tax exemption
for religious organizations is discussed in Paulson, Preferment of Religious Insitutiors
in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAw & CONTs.MP. PROB. 144 (1949).
14. Some taxes cannot be levied against religious activities, even where non.rcligious
groups engaged in the same type of activity must pay the tax. Murdock v. Pa., 319 U.S.
105 (1943) (distributor of religious pamphlets exempt from local license tax) overruling
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 534 (1942); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573
(1944). Thus, a fortiori a tax upon religious groups not applied to other groups engag-
ing in similar activities, would be invalid. Of course, some forms of taxes relating to
religion, such as income and property taxes on preachers, are permissible. Id. at 577-8.
Cf. Murdock case, supra, at 103-9.
15. Government expenditures for religious institutions in military establishments in-
elude chaplains and chapels at West Point, Annapolis, e.g., 29 Stat. 8 c. 22 (1896), 10
U.S.C. § 1033 (1946), and in the Armed services, 64 Stat. 270 (1950), 10 U.S.C.A. § 231a
(1951 Supp.), 13 Stat 46 (1864), 10 U.S.C. § 238 (1946) (Army); R.S. §§ 1396-7, 34
U.S.C. §§ 91, 95 (1946) (Navy). Madison believed chaplaincies in the armed forces to be
violative of the First Amendment. Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 WIu.sW
& MARY Q. 534, 559 (3d ser., 1946), reported in Pfeffer, supra note 7, at 12.
16. Bible reading in the public schools vas upheld in Doremus v. Board of Educa-
tion, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A2d 880 (1950) prob. juri. noted 19 L.W. 3244 (1950). Accord:
Donohue v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854) ; Hackett v. Brooksville, 120 Ky. 603, 87 S.\V.
792 (1905) ; People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927). Contra: State v. District
Board, 76 Wise. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890) ; State v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.V. 846
(1902) ; People v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 333, 92 N.E. 251 (1910). See Tonpr, op.
cit. supra note 13 at 244-49; II STOKES, op. cit. szpra note 7, at 549-72.
17. Released time is an extensive practice in the United States. In 1947 it involved
some 2,000,000 students in 2,20 communities, 1947 YEARzoox, Iz.TEzaAxoNAL CoUNCIL
or RELIGIOUS EDUCATIoN 76 (1947). A study of released time practice since the McCollum
decision indicates that of the school systems reporting which had ever had a released
time program, only 11.8% had discontinued it; half of them due to the Mcollum decision.
NATIONAL EDUCAiON ASSoc 0iox, THE STATUS Or RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INI THU
PuBuc ScHooLs 9, 14 (1949). Various techniques for released time programs include
(1) formal classes in religious education taught in the public school buildings during
regular school hours and involving official cooperative relationships between the school
1952]
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Zorach v. Clauson 1s confronts the Supreme Court with a case involving
this internal conflict in the First Amendment. Parents whose children re-
ceive religious instruction outside of school time are challenging the con-
stitutionality of New York's released time program.1 Under the program a
child may be excused from his regularly scheduled classes for one hour a
week to attend religious classes held off public school property.2 0 This
and church groups; (2) pupils excused during school hours to attend religious educa-
tion classes outside of school building and attendance is reported to the public school;
and (3) same as (2) only school has no responsibility for the administration of tile pro-
gram. For statistical study of the frequency of the systems see id. at 8-14.
18. 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. 2d 463 (1951). The lower court opinions, 198 Misc. 631,
99 N.Y.S. 2d 339, 278 App. Div. 573, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 27, were noted in: 49 CoL. L. REV.
836 (1949), 14 DmoiT L Rv. 216 (1951), 39 GEO. L.J. 148 (1950), 25 ST. Joux's L.
REv. 91 (1950), 20 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 297 (1951).
19. The children of the petitioners attended religious classes outside of public school
hours-Zorach's child at a Protestant Episcopal religious school and Gluck's children
at a Jewish religious school, Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 184 (1950) (dissenting
opinion).
20. The Education Law of New York provides: "Absence for religious observance
and education shall be permitted under rules that the commissioner (the State Commis-
sioner of Education] shall establish." N.Y. Laws 1940, c. 305; N.Y. ED. LAW § 3210, 1-b,
The Tules which the State Commissioner of Education -promulgated provide:
"1. Absence of a pupil from school during school hours for religious observance and
education to be had outside the school building and grounds will be excused upon the
request in writing signed by the parent or guardian of the pupil.
"2. The courses in religious observance and education must be maintained and operated
by or under the control of a duly constituted religious body or of duly constituted re-
ligious bodies.
"3. Pupils must be registered for the courses and a copy of the registration filed with
the local public school authorities.
"4. Reports of attendance of pupils upon such courses shall be filed with tho principal
or teacher at the end of each week.
"5. Such absence shall be for not more than one hour each week at the close of a
session at a time to be fixed by the local school authorities.
"6. In the event that more than one school for religious observance and education is
maintained in any district, the hour for absence for each particular public school in such
district shall be the same for all such religious schools."
Regulations of the Comr. of Education, Art. 17, § 154; State of N.Y. Official Com-
pilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations, Vol. 1, p. 683.
In addition the New York City Board of Education provided:
"1. A program for religious instruction may be initiated by any religious organization,
in cooperation with the parents of pupils concerned. There will be no announcement of
any kind in the public schools relative to the program.
"2. When a religious organization is prepared to initiate a program for religious
instruction, the said organization will notify parents to enroll their children with tho
religious organization, and will issue to each enrolled pupil a card countersigned by the
parent and addressed to the principal of the public school, requesting the release of the
pupil from school for the purpose of religious instruction at a specific location. The said
cards will be filed in the office of the public school as a record of pupils entitled to be
excused, and will not be available for any other purpose.
"3. Religious organizations, in cooperation with parents, will assume full responsibility
for attendance at the religious center and will file with the school principal weckly, a
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release is made upon the request of a parent and a "duly constituted re-
ligious body prepared to initiate a program of religious instruction."
The New York Court of Appeals upheld released time despite the Supreme
Court's prior invalidation of a similar program in Champaign, Illinois.21
There the instruction was on school property and was indirectly supervised
by school authorities. The New York court held that the lesser amount of
school support in the New York program constitutionally distinguished it
from the Champaign plan,22 and it felt bound by earlier New York prece-
dent upholding a similar program.2 3 The court argued that elimination of
the program would impair parents' right to direct the rearing and education
of their children.
Released time is thus attacked as aid and justified as free exercise. By
emphasizing free exercise, the New York court upheld the statute. On the
card attendance record and in cases of absence from religious instruction, a statement
of the reason therefor.
"4. Upon the presentation of a proper request as above prescribed, pupils of any grade
will be dismissed from school for the last hour of the day's session on one day of each
week to be designated by the superintendent of schools; a different day may be designated
for each borough.
"5. Pupils released for religious instruction will be dismissed from school in the usual
way and the school authorities have no responsibility beyond that assumed in regular
dismissals.
"6. There shall be no comment by any principal or teacher on the attendance or non-
attendance of any pupil upon religious instruction."
Issued November 13, 1940 and amended September 24, 1941. Reported in Papers on
appeal in Zorach v. Clauson to N.Y. Court of Appeals, folio 86-95 (hereafter cited as
PAPrmS oN ApEA.).
21. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1943).
22. "It is manifest that the McCollum case is not a holding that all released time
programs are per se unconstitutional.' Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 169, 100 N.E.
463, 465 (1951). A similar narrow construction of the McCollum case was taken by the
Attorneys General in California, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia,
and West Virginia. AascAi JEwIsH ComurrrE, Su n.,us or Run~iNGs or Ar-
TORN-zs GENERL wrrH REsPEc or CHURCH-STATE QuEsTIO;s AS THEY AFFEcr PuBric
AND PAROCHIAL ScHooLs, March 23, 1951. Only a small percentage of the weekday
church schools have stopped functioning as a result of the McCollun decision. According
to one study, NATIoNAL PuBtic EDuc&ToN AssocrATroN, THE STA.Tus or REuGIous
EDUCAnoN IN THE PUBLIc ScnooLs (1949), 61 of the communities reporting had discon-
tinued their program due to the McCollum decision and another 8% had altered their
programs to exclude religious classes from the public school buildings. Another source
indicates that less than 10% of the released time prograrps were discontinued due to
McCollum. Announced by the International Council of Religious Education in February,
1949, reported in BuTrs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 202-3. A broader view of the McCollun
holding was taken by the United States Department of Interior, supervising Indian
schools, and the Attorneys General in Colorado, Kansas Indiana, and Wisconsin have
interpreted the McCollum case to exclude released time programs such as that in New
York. AmmucAN JEwIsH CoMurrzEE, op. cit. supra.
23. People ex reL. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927) (released time
program in White Plains, New York, upheld).
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other hand, stress upon aid could just as logically compel a holding of un-
constitutionality. In deciding on which of the two religious clauses of the
First Amendment to rely, a court actually determines the controversy. This
procedure is inadequate because it does not provide a framework for inquiry
into the relevant facts affecting the overall policy of the First Amendment,
A more desirable way to resolve the conflict is to compare the impact
upon one right resulting from one alternative decision with the effect upon
the competing right if the opposite decision were rendered. The released time
program must be studied in its operation. To determine the encroachment
upon the no aid principle, the amount and effect of actual state aid to religion
involved must be ascertained. Against this must be balanced the restraint
upon the free exercise which would result if the program were invalidated.
Thus, by indicating whether a greater danger to religious freedom exists in
state interference or state aid, the fundamental objective of the First Amend-
ment-to prevent state encroachment from either direction-is promoted.
If the released time program were invalidated, the resulting restraint
upon free exercise would be the inability of parents who so desired to have re-
ligious instruction given to their children during one hour of public school
time weekly. Courts have usually allowed parents, in the exercise of their
religious freedom, reasonably to control -the education of their children.24
But here the restraint on parents' freedom is lessened by the availability of
alternative courses of action. A parent may still elect to send his child to a
private religious school.25 This may, however, be an onerous alternative
where he is already supporting the public school system with taxes, and
may not be feasible for the parent whc cannot afford the added cost of a
private school.26 A second possibility is for th,- parent to provide religioug
24. Parents have a constitutional right to have their children excused from bible
reading in the public school. People ex rel. Voliman v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac.
610 (1927) ; State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348 (1929). See
also Hardwick v. Board, 54 Cal. App. 696, aff'd, 54 Cal. App. 714, 205 Pac. 56 (1921)
(child excused from dancing lessons where religious beliefs forbade dancing). But the
state can make some reasonable requirements that are contrary to religious beliefs. Rice
v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E. 2d 343 (1948) (compulsory education law en-
forced over parents' claim that their religious beliefs dictated that the parent must teach
his own child). See cases, infra note 25.
25. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-402 (1923) (parents' right to control the education of their child).
A recent survey reports 10,071 private elementary schools and 3,292 private secondary
schools in the country. Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education in the United
States 1946-48 c. 1 (1950). No figures are available as to what percent of the private
elementary schools are denominational, but 81% of the private secondary schools are
denominational. Id. at c. 7.
26. A survey of the cost of denominational schools in New Haven indicated that
tuition per year, exclusive of laboratory fees, typing costs, and text book charges for high
schools is: St. Mary's, $150.00; Notre Dame, $170.00. Scholarships are available for
athletic ability and intelligence. Priests of some parishes pay the tuition for some children.
Elementary school fees are: St. Mary's, no tuition for those in the parish, $2.00 a month
for those outside; St. Aedan's, $10.00 a family a year for those in the parish.
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education, such as Sunday School instruction, for his children during non-
school hours. The public school takes about thirty-five hours in the week,-'
leaving ample time for religious instruction. Thus, the elimination of the
program would not prevent the full expression of parental preference that
their children obtain religious education, although it would constitute some
restriction on parents' freedom of choice.
Continuance of released time would sanction infringement of the "separa-
tion doctrine" by state aid existing in three aspects of the program's opera-
tion. One element of aid is the New York Education Law. It requires
through its truancy provisions that those students who are released actually
attend their religious classes.28 A released child who fails to attend religious
classes has no excused absence from public school and is thus a truant. -
In enforcing the truancy law upon released time truants some school districts
interview the child to find out why he did not attend the religious instruc-
tion.30 Other districts, if the child is frequently truant, refuse him permis-
sion to be released for religious instruction.31 Still others use these tech-
niques jointly.32 In addition to the actual enforcement sanctions, the very
27. Computed on the basis of a five-day school week with classes from 8:30 A.M.
to 3:30 P.M.
28. The New York Education Law provides that each minor from 7 to 16 years of
age shall attend school, N.Y. ED. LAw §3205 (L), and that he shall be excused only
for causes allowed by the general rules and the practices of the public schoals. Id. at
§ 3210 (2) (b). The teachers and principals are responsible for keeping an attendance
record of every child for each day and hour of the school year. Id. at §3211. The
Commissioner of Education is responsible for supervising the overall enforcement of
the truancy provisions. Id. at § 3229. Jail sentences or fines can be levied against those
who violate the Education Law. Id. at § 3228.
29. Statement of the Soliciter General for the State of New York in oral argument
before the Appellate Division Court. Referred to in Reply Brief for Petitioners-
Appellants, Court of Appeals, p. 38.
Students have excused absences only if they attend religious classes; otherwise the
absence is unexcused. N.Y. ED. LAw § 3210. Also see Rules 1 and 4 of the Regulations
of the Commissioner of Education, and Rule 3 of the Regulations issued by the Board
of Education of the City of New York, supra note 20.
30. Letter from David Bray, Chief of Bureau of Child Accounting, Enforcement
and Census, City of Albany to Mr. John Park, Superintendent of Schools, Albany,
New York, May 14, 1948. PAPEEs o- APPEAL folio 172-9.
31. Letter from Harold French, Superintendent of Schools, Newtonville, New
York, to Mr. Charles Brind, Counsel and Assistant Commissioner, State Education De-
partment, May 13, 1948. PAPEs oN APPEAL folio 166-71.
32. Letter from Kenneth MacFarland, Superintendent of Schools, Rensselaer, New
York, to 'Mr. Charles Brind, Counsel and Assistant Commissioner, State Education
Department, May 13, 1948. Pan, s oN APPE.AL folio 181-6.
Rule 3 of the regulations of the Board of Education in New York City instructs the
schools, in effect, not to enforce the truancy law, and places the primary responsibility
for attendance at the religious center on the parents and the religious organizations
operating the classes. See note 20 supra. However the added requirement that the
religious center file attendance cards with the principal is contradictory to the provision
placing full responsibility for attendance on the religious organization and parents. Rule
3, Regulations of the N.Y.C. Board of Education and Rule 4, Regulations of the State
1952]
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existence of the law may influence the released child to attend his religious
classes.3 3 Use of the compulsory education law in a released time program
was expressly condemned in the McCollum decision.a4
The machinery of the public school also makes a substantial contribution
to the operation and success of released time. Time and labor of teachers
and school officials is required to administer the program. They must obtain
and file cards of excused children; prepare, distribute, and keep current lists
for classroom teachers of released time students; supervise an additional
classroom dismissal; and secure and check absence reports of religious
centers.3 5 Some teachers, despite the Board of Education's prohibition of
comment on the attendance or non-attendance of pupils at religious classes,80
encourage children to attend religious classes or actually recruit them for
such instruction.3 7 The persistence of this practice over the years, 8 despite
Commissioner of Education. See note 20 supra. In operation, the regulations are ex-
tensively disregarded and many schools enforce the truancy laws as the schools in other
districts. Affidavits of Henrietta Birman (teacher), Maurice Dawkins (teacher),
Wendy Gluck (student), Affidavits, King County Clerk's Number 10327/1948, Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of Kings. Also PUBLIC EDUCATION ASSoCIA-
TION, RELASED TI E FOR RELiGiOUs EDUCATION IN NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS 6.7
(1943) ; same title, (1945), at 7; same title, (1949), at 22-3.
33. On the pressure which any law exerts toward conformity see Dxcay, LEcrutmws
ON THE RELATIoNs BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINu-
TEENTH CENTURY 465 (1941); Maslow, Prejudice, Discrhinination and the Law, 275
ANNALs 9 (1951); Polier, Law, Conscience, and Society, 6 LAW. GUILD Rxv. 490 (1946).
34. "Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in
part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This
is beyond all question a utilization of the tax established public school system to aid
religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely within the ban of the First
Amendment. . ." Black, J., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203, 209-10 (1948). See also id. at 212, 227.
35. Affidavits of Leona Abrams (teacher), Henrietta Birman (teacher), Maurice A.
Dawkins (teacher), William Hendrie (principal), Minnie Sutro (teacher), Affidavits,
Kings County Clerk's Number 10327/1948, Supreme Court of the State of New York,
County of Kings. See also PUBLIC EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (1943), op. cit. supra note
32, at 6, 8, 9; same title, (1945), at 8-9, 10; same title, (1949), at 12, 14-16, 18.
36. Rule 6, Board of Education, City of New York, op. cit. supra note 20.
37. Examples of this type of coercion are: "Miss Jeffries (a teacher) distributed
blank consent cards to the children in her class and asked the children publicly for a
show of hands of those who were going to participate in the released time program.
Miss Jeffries scolded those students who had participated in the released time program the
term before but who did not raise their hands to show that they were continuing."
Affidavit of Wendy Gluck, Affidavits, Kings County Clerk's Number 10327/1948, Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of Kings. "A student in her class became ill
and vomited in the classroom. Miss Jeffries said to the sick student that she did not
object at looking at the vomit as much as she objected to looking at the student's face
because he did not participate in the released time program." Affidavit of Esta Gluck,
ibid. See also affidavit of Anne Stewart and PUBLIC EDUCATION AssOCIATION (1943),
op. cit. supra note 32 at 7-8; same title, (1945), at 15; same title, (1949), at 13, 17-18, 28,
38. Influencing of children by teachers appeared in the 1943, 1945, and 1949 studies
of the Public Education Association. See note 37 supra.
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its prohibition, suggests that this is an abuse inherent in the program. 1 The
teacher exerts considerable influence on the children,40 and her contribution
to the religious education program can be important.41  Moreover, high
schools aid the released time program by allowing scholastic credit for re-
ligious instruction.2
Further state aid for religion exists in the substantial contribution made
by the school milieu to the recruitment of children for religious classes. The
public school environment is a significant factor in motivating behavior,43
39. It is important to study the actual practice since there are indications that the
rules are not always literally followed. Rule 4 of the New York City Board of Educa-
tion's Regulations before September 24, 1941 read, "Pupils of any grade will be dismissed
from school for the last hour of each week, except that in classes on a departmental
schedule release will be limited to the last period of the program' 'Mr. William Hendrie,
who was then a principal in a school employing the departmental schedule, released his
children at 2:30 as instructed by the regulation. Mr. Jansen, then Associate Superintend-
ent of Schools and now Superintendent of Schools called and told Mr. Hendrie not to
interpret the rules literally and to dismiss the students in the departmentally scheduled
classes promptly at 2:00 p. m. Affidavit of M.r. William Hendrie, Kings County Clerk's
Number 10327/1948, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings.
40. See NATio.AL EDucATioN AssocATioI, DEP.%RT3,1MNT Or Seoo. Pa eMx.As,
PERsoNAirr ADJUSTMENT OF TE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHmU 385 (1936); Carrington,
Teacher Personality as a Factor in Child Adjustment. N.TIoxAL EDuCAmo: ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Pnn:cnwAx.s 1STh
YEAxsoK 586-94 (1936).
41. Another, though more infrequent, practice used by teachers to induce attendance
at the released time program is the giving of onerous work to the children who remain
in the public school. A student reports, "My sixth grade teacher, Miss Croft, urged the
children in the class to participate in the released time program and she stated that those
students who did not participate would be required to do long division arithmetic problems
during every released time hour, whereas those children who did participate were to be
excused from this exercise. While I was in 'Miss Croft's class, the students who remained
in the public school after 2 'cjock on Thursdays were given long division arithmetic
problems beyond the level of the normal expectation of sixth grade." Affidavit of Anne
Stewart, Affidavits, Kings County Clerk's Number 103-77/1948, Supreme Court of the
State of New York, County of Kings. Also Affidavit of Mrs. Gussie Finer, ibid. See
PtBLac EDucATroN AssocrATIoN (1943) op. cit. supra note 32, at 13; same title, (1945),
at 16; same title, (1949), at 23-4.
42. Credit is allowed for released time religious instruction on the basis of one-fourth
unit per year. A maximum of one unit is allowed. A total of 248 schools in New York State
are receiving credit on this basis. The number of religious groups participating are:
Jewish 9; Protestant (27 different affiliations) 75; Roman Catholic 162; other 2. Com-
munications from George K. Stone, Acting Chief, Bureau of Curriculum Development,
Division of Secondary Education, University of the State of New York to Yale La,
Journal dated November 20,1951, and December 10, 1951, on file in the Yale La,,,
Library. A study of released time programs in high school indicates that one of the
principal motivations for students to take released tmie courses in high school was to
obtain credit toward graduation. McClure, Vcckday Religious Education at the High
School Level, 46 RELIGIous EDUCATION 345, 352 (1951).
43. For a description of the school environment and its impact on the individual see:
BossAmn, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHrLD DEVELOPMENT 459-92 (1948); LEE & LEr, THE
CurLD AxD His CURIcULUM 74, 95-103 (2d ed. 1950); ANtALL, Tim Seciowov op
TEACHING c. 2 (1932).
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and it must be considered in evaluating the total contribution of the school,
as an institution,44 to religious education. 45 Holding religious classes during
school hours aids religious instructon since it can more easily compete with
classroom time than with recreational time.40 Such encouragement may be
lessened in some schools because the released time period activities may be
enjoyable, 47 or may include important school work 48 which the children
may not want to miss.4 9  In addition, group interactions are an effective
assistance to recruitment of children for religious classes and this has been
regarded as "state action" in aid of religion.5 0 Children belong to social
groups not ordinarily based on religion or released time attendance.0 1 Studies
44. Willard Wailer finds five characteristics which are common to all kinds of schools
and set them apart as social unities: (1) They have a definite population; (2) they have
a clearly defined social structure, arising from the mode of social interaction peculiar to
the school; (3) they represent a compact network of social relationships; (4) they are
pervaded by a we-feeling; and (5) they have a culture which is definitely their own.
Reported in BossARD, op. cit. supra note 43, at 460.
45. Environment factors were expressly considered in the McCollum case. Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), especially at 227 n. 18.
46. Fuld, J., (dissent), Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 188 (1951); see also Note,
57 YALE L.J. 114, 119 (1948).
47. A few of the classes during the released time period include such subjects as
handwork, auditorium, plays, and canteen. PUBLIC EDUCATION AssocIATIoN (1949), op. cit.
supra note 32, at 24. See also note 41 supra.
48. This is despite regulations of the New York City Board of Education instructing
teachers not to give new work in the released time period. New York City Board of
Education General Circular No. 1 (1948-49). That new work is given in some classes see :
PUBLIc EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (1949), op. cit. supra note 32, at 24 (8 classes of 243
reported).
49. Sometimes children would rather remain in public school. PunLc EDUCATION
AssocIAnON (1945), op. cit. supra note 32, at 16. Affidavits of Maurice Dawkins
(teacher), and William Hendrie (principal), Affidavits, Kings County Clerk's Number
10327/1948, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings.
50. In the McCollum case Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, which had the support
of three other Justices, considered the effect of the group on the individual as one of tile
elements of prohibited state aid to religion. "The law of imitation operates, and non.
conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious
pressure upon children to attend." 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948). Justice Frankfurter added,
"The momentum of the whole school atmosphere and school planning is presumably put
behind religious instruction, as given in Champaign, precisely in order to secure for tile
religious instruction such momentum and planning." 333 U.S. 203, 230-1 (1948). Sec
also id. at 227 n. 18. Of course all group pressure in a community would not be state action,
Only that which occurs in the framework of a state operated institution can be said to be
a part of that institution. Group pressure of school children is a part of the school as a
social institution. See note 44 supra.
51. Group unity forms among children in the early primary school. IuuOCIC, CHIiL
DEVELOPMENT 236 (1942); THORPE, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND DFvw0.PMEN 558 (1946).
The primary bases for friendship formation of primary school children are: propinquity
of the children, same mental and physical age. HuRLocH, op. cit. supra at 247; MuPHY,
MuRPHY, & NrwcomB, EXPE RIMETAL SoCIAL PsYcnomGv 513 (1931); Tuoiu, op.
cit. supra at 595.
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have shown that a group influences children so strongly that they frequently
accept its judgment even when they know that judgment is wrong, 2 and
in matters of opinion, children follow their friends almost completely.t3
Thus, when a child in the public school sees his friends leave to attend
religious classes, the social interactions of the school, as an institution, impel
him toward religious instructon. When parents refuse to allow children to
attend religious classes with their friends, the children may become emotion-
ally disturbed.54 This reaction indicates the coercion on the children to
attend religious classes. Such coercion, even though not completely success-
ful in forcing conformity in all situations, was regarded in the McColhou
case as one of the abridgments of the separation doctrine r-'
52. Children were asked to judge which of three lines vwas the shortest. When not
subject to control of the group they were able to give correct answers 93% of the time.
Faced with the group pressure the correct answers ot children 7-10 years old dropped to
43%, and the correct answers of children 10-13 dropped to 54%. 93% of the younger
children and 80% of the older children were affected by the group. Children commenting
on the test said: "I felt funny. I know it will be silly, but when they said an answer
and I didn't think it was right, I felt like my heartbeat went down:' "I had a funny
feeling inside. You know you are right and they are wrong, and you agree with them."
BERENDA, IiUFLuENc OF THE GROUP ON THE JUDGMENT OF CHI1Man 14-32 (1950). On
the strong control of the peer group see, BRowN, SOCIOLOGY oF CrLDnooD 164, 169-70
(1939) ; BossARD, op. cit. sumra note 43, at 504, 507; Hunx.ocx, op. cit. supra note 51
at 218, 233, 236-7; LEE & LFan, op. cit. mipra note 43, at 74.
53. In a test of food preferences there was virtually complete identification of
choices between close friends. Duncker, Experimental Modification of Children's Food
Preference Through Social Suggestion, 33 Joum OF ABNORAL AND SocLuL PsYcuOLOGY
489 (1938). Cf. RISUmAN, THE LONELY Caowu (1950).
54. A former non-released student describes her experiences as follows: "When the
released time children departed at 2:00 p. m. on Wednesdays, I felt left behind. The re-
leased children made remarks about my being Jewish and I was made very much aware
of the fact that I did not participate with them in the released time pro-gram. I endured
a great deal of anguish as a result of this and decided that I would like to go along
with the other children to the church center rather than continue to expose myself to
such embarrassment. I asked my mother for permission to participate in the released
time program to accompany my Catholic classmates to their religious center, but she
forbade it. The divisiveness created by the released time program among the public
school children became a part of our after school play. Following the introduction of
released time at P.S. 163, Brooklyn, I began to notice I was ostracized by other children
in after school activities. I was not permitted to share in their play, and they made un-
flattering remarks about my not going to the church center because I was Jewish. As a
result of arguments about my nonparticipation in released time, my classmates called me
such names as 'Christ killer' and 'dirty Jew.' I still live in the same neighborhood and
to this day I do not talk to many of the girls with whom I went to school because of the
arguments and fights which developed among us as a result of our differences which
developed from the released time program." Statement of Leah Cunn, Affidavits, Kings
County Clerk's Number 10327/1948, New York Supreme Court, County of Kings. See
also affidavits by Gussie Finer and Charles Stewart, ibid.
55. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 227-8, 230-1
(1948). See note 50 supra.
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The invalidation of the New York released time program is suggested by
this analysis. The impairment of the free exercise right would be less than
the impairment of the no-aid principle represented by the quantum and effects
of the state aid to religion found in the released time system. But whatever
decision may finally be reached after an analysis of the foregoing type, this
method provides the most satisfactory means of making a constitutional
determination in situations embodying a conflict in the First Amendment's
religious clauses.
